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Abstract—Unsolicited email (spam) is still a problem for
users of the email service. Even though current email anti-spam
solutions filter most spam emails, some still are delivered to
the inbox of users. A special class of spam emails advertises
websites, e.g., online dating sites or online pharmacies. The
success rate of this kind of advertising is rather low, however, as
sending an email does only involve minimal costs, even a very
low success rate results in enough revenue such that this kind
of advertising pays off. The anti-spam approach presented in
this paper aims on increasing the costs for websites that are
advertised by spam emails and on lowering the revenues from
spam emails. Costs can be increased for a website by increasing
traffic. Revenues can be decreased by making the website slow
responding as some business gets lost. To increase costs and
decreased revenues a decentralized peer-to-peer coordination
mechanism is used to have mail clients to agree on a start date
and time for an anti-spam campaign. During a campaign, all
clients that received spam emails advertising a website send an
opt-out request to this website. A huge number of opt-out requests
results in increased traffic to this website and will likely result in a
slower responsibility of the website. The coordination mechanism
presented in this paper is based on a peer-to-peer mechanisms
and a so-called paranoid trust model to avoid manipulation by
spammers. A prototype implementation for the Thunderbird
email client exist. The anti-spam approach presented in this
paper breaks the economy of spam, hence, makes advertising
by unsolicited emails unattractive.
Keywords—spam; unsolicited email; peer-to-peer; security (key
words)
I. INTRODUCTION
According to [3], spam accounts for 64.1% of all emails.
For this paper, spam refers to an unwanted email and spammer
refers to the person sending this unwanted email. According to
[1] spam is used for the follwing purposes: advertise services
or products (e.g., pharmaceutical drugs, dating sites, etc.),
distribute malware, scam
Anti-spam solutions targeting servers used by spammers
(blacklists) are of limited use, as nowadays more than 80% of
spam messages are sent with the help of botnets [2]. Hence,
no central server is the source of spam but thousands of
regular clients using thousands of legitimate email providers.
Email filtering based on the content of spam emails [14] is an
effective method to filter spam mails, however it can not be
guaranteed that legitimate emails are not classified as spam.
Also, spammers usually optimize their spam emails such that
they pass Bayesian filters. In spam mails advertising a website,
the URL is hard to obfuscate, because a user must have an easy
way to go to the advertised website for the spam mail to be
successful. According to [3], spam advertising sex sites, dating
sites or sites selling pharmaceutical drugs make up for 86.52%
of all spam. Hence, an anti-spam approach targeting this class
of spam is highly relevant. The approach presented in this
paper targets on websites advertised by spam. It aims on both
increasing the cost to maintain the website as decreasing the
revenue of the website. In [4], this is described as one way to
stop spam as the success rate of spam is very low. Increasing
the costs for the advertised website or decreasing the revenue
of the website may lead to spam not being profitable any more.
The approach presented in this paper increases the costs and
decreases the revenue:
• Cost increase: clients send opt-out request to websites
advertised by spam. These opt-out requests result in
additional traffic to the website. If the owner of a
website pays for traffic to his site, costs are increased
to maintain the website.
• Revenue decrease: clients coordinate to send opt-
out requests at nearly the same time, resulting in
the website becoming slow in response. The website
may loose some business because customers do not
want to wait for the page to load. Sometimes spam
websites are hosted on compromised hosts. Increasing
the traffic to these hosts results in a higher probability
that the administrator of the compromised host notices
the infection of the host because legitimate services
run slower than usual. It is very likely that the adminis-
trator then takes down the unwanted website, reducing
the success rate for this website to 0%.
Multiple clients that received spam send opt-out requests
in a so-called campaign. A campaign is defined by one target
URL as well as a start date and time. Opt-out requests are
sent after the start date and time. Clients participating in a
campaign are called comrades. To participate in a campaign,
a client must have received a spam mail advertising a website
that leads to the URL of the campaign. Hence, it is ensured that
clients only send opt-out requests for spam mails they really
received. The result of a campaign is much traffic on a site
as well as a slow responsiveness of the site. A coordination
algorithm based on a peer-to-peer network is used to let
comrades agree on a start date and time for their campaign. The
coordination algorithm uses a so-called paranoid trust model to
avoid manipulations by spammers. As long as the peer-to-peer
network implements a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) offering
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a PUT method to store information in the DHT and a PULL
method to receive information from the DHT, any DHT can
be used by the coordination algorithm. It is advised to use an
existing DHT resilient to Distributed Denial of Service attacks,
e.g., a file sharing peer-to-peer network with a huge user base
like eMule [15] or other resilient peer-to-peer networks like
NeighborhoodWatch [11].
It should be noted that the approach sketched may result in
a Distributed Denial of Service attack on websites advertised
by spam. It is an open legal question if sending an opt-
out request using the proposed system is legal. This question
can only be answered individually for each country and is
out of scope of this technical paper. However, the existence
of other opt-out anti-spam solutions (see Section II for a
thorough discussion on related work) indicates, that countries
exist where using the anti-spam solution proposed in this paper
is legal.
Another problem are false positives: a spammer could try
to abuse the proposed anti-spam solution by sending spam
mails for an innocent website, e.g., to discredit the website of
a competitor. A careful examination of emails is necessary to
avoid false positives. Giving the user the possibility to check
the website the anti-spam solution identified as potential target
of a campaign may help to avoid false positives.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section II
discusses related work. Section III gives an overview of the
system architecture. Section IV presents the distributed coordi-
nation mechanism of the proposed anti-spam solution. Section
V introduced a paranoid trust model used for the presented
approach. Section VI presents a prototype implementation for
Thunderbird. Section VII evaluates the anti-spam approach
presented in this paper under different attacks. Section VIII
concludes the paper and gives an outlook on future work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section presents related work on fighting spam by
increasing the cost of spam and related work on using a DHT
to fight spam.
Hashcash [8] [9] is used to target Denial of Service
attacks. Hashcash is a challenge-response approach. In [8] [9],
hashcash is used to increase the cost of sending email. To do
so, when an email clients delivers an email to a mail server,
the email server does not accept the email at once. Instead,
the mail server provides a challenge to the mail client. The
challenge requires some computational effort to be solved. The
solution of the challenge is sent together with the mail. The
mail server only accepts mails that include a solved challenge.
Hence, the solved challenge can be seen as a virtual stamp.
With this system, sending a single mail is still fast, but sending
thousands of messages is significantly slowed, resulting in a
lower spam per time rate increasing the cost of spam. However,
there are some disadvantages:
• Hashcash helps email providers to throttle down the
number of mails its users can sent. This helps an
email provider to avoid abuse of its service. However,
spammers often have an email provider of their own
or directly deliver the message. Also, service for users
of the email provider is limited.
• Hashcash only avoids sending a huge bulk of emails.
According to [2], more than 80% of spam is sent with
the help of a botnet. Hence, each zombie of a botnet
has a much smaller bulk of emails to sent. Hashcash
is not very effective to avoid spam sent by a botnet.
Some anti-spam approaches already use a DHT to fight
spam, e.g., NeighborhoodWatch [11], a blacklist of IP ad-
dresses of known spammers. Although NeighborhoodWatch
prevents Distributed Denial of Service attacks on the blacklist,
it does not increase costs for spammers, hence, does not target
the business model of spammers. However, the DHT used by
NeighborhoodWatch can be used for the approach presented
in this paper.
The startup company Blue Frog [12] offered a software
that let email users send coordinated opt-out requests for spam
they received similar to the approach presented in this paper.
Blue Frog was very successful and forced six of the top ten
bulk email groups to cooperate with them to remove users
of the Blue Frog software from their email lists [12]. Hence,
Blue Frog showed that a coordinated opt-out approach to fight
spam can be very successful. Lycos [13] offered a similar
approach with its ”Make Love not Spam” campaign. However,
both Lycos and Blue Frog used a central coordination for the
period of time the clients should send opt-out requests. This
central coordination is vulnerable to attacks. In the case of Blue
Frog, the central coordination mechanism was brought down
by a massive Denial of Service attack. Another disadvantage of
Blue Frog was the way users submitted received spam mails:
users were asked to forward received spam mails. This resulted
in users being blacklisted by mail providers that scan outgoing
mails for spam mails. The approach presented in this paper
follows the idea of coordinated opt-out requests. The success
of Blue Frog and Lycos showed that the traffic generated by
sending coordinated opt-out requests has a significant impact
on the business model of spammers and websites advertised
by spam. However, the approach presented in this paper tries
to avoids the disadvantages of the solutions of Blue Frog and
Lycos: no central coordination is used and users do not have
to forward spam mails.
III. SYSTEM DESIGN
This section gives an overview of the proposed anti-spam
solution. The following sections focus on one part of the sys-
tem: the Campaign Coordinator. The Campaign Coordinator is
the main difference to existing anti-spam solutions as discussed
in Section II.
The proposed anti-spam solution has four components:
Spam Classifier, Target Evaluator, Campaign Coordinator, and
Opt-Out Module
The Spam Classifier decides which emails are spam and
which are not. One possible implementation includes a user
interaction that allows a user to express which emails are
spam from his point of view. Involving the user for spam
classification has the benefit, that only the user can decide
what ”unwanted” mail means for him. Also, involving the
user may help to avoid false positives. If not enough users
decide that an email is spam, no campaign will take place.
The Spam Classifier passes spam mails to the Target Evaluator.
The Target Evaluator extracts one or more URLs from a spam
email. As a user must have a possibility to go to the website
advertised by a spam mail, it is assumed that the identification
of the URL of the website is possible. The Target Evaluator
outputs URLs of the advertised website. A careful evaluation
of the mail content is necessary because of the following
reasons:
• Spam mails may use redirector services like TinyURL
[16] for advertised website. The URLs of the redirec-
tion service may even be different for each spam mail.
While getting a redirection URL already increases the
cost of sending spam, this may be efficient to avoid
spam campaigns because all URLs are different. To
avoid this attack, the Target Evaluator looks for the
use of redirection services.
• URLs in spam mails may contain parameters that
identify emails of users. Hence, going to this URL
may verify the email address of a receiver, potentially
resulting in getting even more spam. Also, parameters
of a URL may be different for each user. Hence, the
Target Evaluator needs to strip parameters from URLs.
• Some email providers add footers to outgoing mail
advertising their service. This footers usually include
the URL of the mail server providers website, e.g.,
”This mail was sent by www.gmx.de”. The Target
Evaluator has a whitelist of URLs not to attack to
avoids that such legitimate URLs become targets of
anti-spam campaigns.
• An attacker could try to abuse the anti-spam solution
by sending URLs of innocent websites in spam mails
to provoke an attack on the innocent website.
It may be a good idea to involve the user in identifying
the URLs to avoid false positives. The user decides on the
websites to attack. The Target Evaluator is out of scope of
this paper. The Target Evaluator passes one ore more URLs to
the Campaign Coordinator.
The Campaign Coordinator is the heart of the anti-spam
approach presented in this paper. The Campaign Coordinator
uses a peer-to-peer network to identify other clients that also
received a spam mail advertising the same URL. All clients
that received this spam mail decide on a date and time when
to start a campaign against the website with the given URL.
The Campaign Coordinator is described in more detail in IV.
The Opt-Out Module is invoked at the date and time when
a campaign starts. The module starts to send opt-out requests
to the website. Please note that the Opt-Out Module does not
depend on the availability of an opt-out link in the spam mail.
One possible implementation of the attack module scans the
website at the given URL for images and sends the opt-out
request as a parameter in a GET request to all images. This
opt-out request will show up in the log of the web server.
Sending opt-out requests in this way can not even be stopped
by using a captcha on the website to avoid automated opt-out
requests. The opt-out requests result in traffic to the site, and
the coordinated start of the campaign may result in a slower
response of the website due to many requests. The Opt-Out
Module is out of scope of the paper, successful opt-out anti-
spam solutions like those discussed in Section II show that
Campaign	  Table	  
	  
www.buyviagra.com	  
	  
www.buyviagra.com	  
	  
www.buyviagra.com	  
	  
www.date4u.com	  
01/09/13-­‐11:30:00MEZ	  
	  
03/09/13-­‐08:00:00MEZ	  
	  
03/09/13-­‐01:00:00MEZ	  
	  
30/08/13-­‐04:31:00MEZ	  
Fig. 1. Example for a campaign table holding two campaigns.
01/09/13-­‐11:30:00M
EZwww.buyviagra.co
m	  
	  
01/09/13-­‐11:30:00M
EZwww.buyviagra.co
m	  
	  
03/09/13-­‐08:00:00M
EZwww.buyviagra.co
m	  
	  
03/09/13-­‐01:00:00M
EZwww.buyviagra.co
m	  
	  
30/08/13-­‐04:31:00M
EZwww.date4u.com	  
Campaign	  Comrades	  Table	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  A	  
	  
	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  B	  
	  
	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  B	  
	  
	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  C	  
	  
	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  D	  
Fig. 2. Example for a campaign comrades table for Figure 1.
enough traffic can be generated to have an impact on the
business model of websites advertised by spam.
The rest of this paper focuses on the central component of
the system: the Campaign Coordinator. The Campaign Coor-
dinator is the main difference to existing anti-spam solutions
as discussed in Section II.
IV. DESIGN OF THE CAMPAIGN COORDINATOR
The Campaign Coordinator is the heart of the anti-spam
approach presented in this paper. A campaign is identified
by exactly one URL. If the Target Evaluator extracts more
than one URL from a spam mail, it invokes the Campaign
Coordinator once for each URL.
The Campaign Coordinator uses a DHT like Kademlia [5]
or Chord [6]. Only PUT and GET options of these DHTs
are used, hence, it is not necessary to start a new DHT but
an existing DHT can be used. Many file sharing systems are
based on DHTs. One of those could be used for the approach
presented here. Reusing an existing DHT has the benefit of
using a large peer-to-peer network that is not as vulnerable
to attacks (e.g. Sybil attack) as a small network. Reusing an
existing network may also make it easier to join the network
[7].
Campaign Coordinators access three different tables stored
in the DHT:
Inbox	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  A	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  A	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  B	  
	  
Public	  Key	  Client	  C	  
EPK	  Client	  A(message	  1	  to	  A)	  
	  
EPK	  Client	  A(message	  2	  to	  A)	  
	  
EPK	  Client	  B(message	  to	  B)	  
	  
EPK	  Client	  C(message	  to	  C)	  
Fig. 3. Example for an inbox.
Campaign Table: the Campaign Table lists available cam-
paigns. A campaign is identified by the URL of the website
that is the target of this campaign. The database key to the
Campaign Table is the URL, the hash value of the URL is
used to access the DHT. The entries in the campaign table
list one or more start times and start dates for this campaign.
Figure 1 gives an example of a Campaign Table: one of the
campaigns has multiple start dates and times.
Campaign Comrades Table: the Campaign Comrades Table
lists all the clients that are willing to participate in a given
campaign at a given time. Clients participating in a campaign
are called comrades in the following. The database key for
the Campaign Comrades Table is the start date and time of
the campaign concatenated with the URL. The corresponding
hash value is used to access the DHT. If multiple start dates
and times exist for one campaign, there are multiple database
keys for the Campaign Comrades Table. Figure 2 gives an
example for a Campaign Comrades Table: there is one start
date and time with two comrades, the other start dates and
times only have one comrade. Client B decided to participate
in two campaigns, the other clients only participate in one
campaign. It should be noted that the concatenated start date
and time and URL are not actually stored in the DHT. Instead,
the hash value of the concatenated start date and time and URL
is used as access database key to the DHT. Please note that the
URLs in this example are only examples - it is not known to
the author that any of these URLs have been advertised using
spam mails.
Inbox: The inbox is used to allow clients to receive
encrypted messages. The database key of this table is the public
key of the client. The hash value of the public key of the client
is used to access the DHT. A message to a client is sent by
encrypting the message with the public key of the client and
storing in the DHT using the hash value of the database key to
access the DHT. A message is received when a client gets all
entries in the DHT for the hash value of its private key. Read
messages should be removed. Figure 3 showns an example of
the Inbox table: Client A has two pending messages, Client
B and C have one pending message. EPK(message) denotes
that message is encrypted using public key PK.
The configuration of the Campaign Coordinator uses the
following parameters:
• Keying Material: a public key together with the asso-
ciated private key. The public key is used as identity
of this client in the Campaign Comrades Table as well
as the address of his Inbox in the DHT.
• Acceptable Time Interval: The parameters max wait
and min wait are used to decide on valid campaign
start dates and times.
• Minimum Size of Campaign: min comrades , the
minimum number of comrades in one campaign to
participate in this campaign.
• Minimum Accumulated Trust Values:
minaccummulatedtrust, the minimum accumulated
trust value of all comrades in a campaign that is
necessary that a Campaign Coordinator takes place in
a campaign. See Section V for details of the so-called
paranoid trust model used for the proposed anti-spam
solution.
• Usage Time: information on when the client is avail-
able and can participate in campaigns. Usage time is
either manually defined by the user, or usage of the
mail client and uptime of the system are monitored.
• Trust Database: a database holding trust information
about other clients. See Section V for details of the
so-called paranoid trust model used for the proposed
anti-spam solution.
The Campaign Coordinator is invoked by the Target Eval-
uator. It receives one URL identifying one campaign. After
invocation, the Campaign Coordinator follows the following
procedure:
• Step 1: The Campaign Coordinator checks if there
is already one or more entries for the given URL
in the Campaign Table. It either selects one or more
campaign start date and time from the DHT or decides
to propose a better suited start date and time to other
clients. If the Campaign Coordinator proposes another
start date and time it stores the alternative start date
and time in the Campaign Table. It uses the hash value
of the URL to access the DHT. A campaign start date
and time must meet the following conditions to be
considered suitable for the client:
◦ A campaign start date and time may not be
more than max wait minutes or less then
min wait minutes in the future. max wait
and min wait are local settings of the Cam-
paign Coordinator. This setup avoids that a
spammer inserts a campaign start date and time
into the Campaign Table that lies many years
in the future, hence, no attack takes place, or
repeatedly adds a campaign start date in the
very near future to avoid that many clients
participate in a campaign.
◦ A campaign start date and time should be in a
time period where the computer of the client
is typically running. To do so, the Campaign
Coordinator considers the typical usage times
of the client. For example, if the Campaign
Coordinator is implemented as a plugin for an
email client, it will prefer the date and times
a user typically uses the email client.
A new entry is inserted into the Campaign Table if
the Campaign Table has no entry for the URL yet or
if the present start dates and times are not suitable.
If multiple campaign start dates exist and more than
one of them are suitable for the client, the Campaign
Coordinator either joins all suitable campaigns or
decides to join the campaign with the highest trust
value. See Section V for details about the trust model.
• Step 2: The Campaign Coordinator adds his public key
for all selected start dates and times to the associated
Campaign Comrades Tables. The database key for a
given start time and date in the DHT is the hash value
of the campaign start data concatenated with the URL
of the campaign. Hence, different start dates result in
different database keys.
• Step 3: The Campaign Coordinator adds the URL of
the campaign to a local database together with the
selected start dates and times. The database holds all
currently active campaigns for this Campaign Coordi-
nator. The processing of the URL ends.
The Campaign Coordinator regularly checks if one of the
campaigns in his local database recently started. If so, the client
again checks if he wants to take part in the campaign. To
do so, it retrieves the information from the Comrades Tables
again. At this point in time, the Comrades Table holds a list
of all comrades that take place in this campaign. Comrades
are identified by their public key. The Campaign Coordinator
checks if more than min comrades clients participate in the
campaign. Only if the number of comrades is high enough,
hence, the campaign will involve enough clients to be effective,
the client participates in this campaign. Optionally, the client
checks if the enough participating comrades are trusted. See
Section V for details on the used trust model. If the Campaign
Coordinator decides to participate in a campaign, it invokes
the Opt-Out Module. The Opt-Out-Module sends the opt-out
requests to the URL of the campaign.
It should be noted that all information about campaigns
are public. Hence, a spammer may know about a campaign in
the future targeting one or more websites advertised by him.
The actions of the website administrator may include setting
up firewall rules to block access for certain nodes to mitigate
the attack as well as increasing server capacity. However, both
actions involve additional costs. Hence, the goal of a campaign
is still achieved.
V. TRUST MODEL
The Campaign Manager holds a database with trust values
for known clients. Clients are identified by their public key.
These public keys come from the Campaign Comrade Table,
see Section IV for details. Several methods are used to
establish trust:
Paranoid Trust Model: In the paranoid trust model, the
client only believes what it sees. During a campaign, a client
probes the responsiveness of the URL of the campaign. If
the responsiveness decreases significantly the campaign is a
success, the campaign manager increases the trust value of all
comrades involved in this campaign. A client may even test
the responsiveness of a website if it decided not to take part in
the associated campaign. This helps to built up trust quickly.
If a client detects that several campaigns did not succeed, it
resets its trust database. This is an extra countermeasure to
avoid manipulation of the trust database.
Trust by Challenge-Response: A challenge response-
approach is used to establish trust with an unknown client.
Trust is only established with clients that participate in one
of the own campaigns. A client A wants to establish trust
with an unknown client B. To do so, client A generates a
challenge that requires some computational effort to solve it
(see below for details of the generation of the challenge).
Client A stores the response to the challenge together with
the public key of client B. Client A generates a message for
client B holding Client A’s public key as well as the challenge.
Client A encrypts the message with client B’s public key.
The public key of client B usually comes from the Campaign
Comrade Table. Client A stores the message in the Inbox of
client B. When the Campaign Manager of client B checks its
Inbox, it decrypts the message using its private key. Client B
solves the challenge. Client B generates a message holding
the solution to the challenge as well as the public key of
client B. Client B encrypts the message with the public key
of client A and stores it in the Inbox of client A. When the
Campaign Manager of client A checks its Inbox, it compares
the response received to the response stored locally under
the given public key. Trust by Challenge-Response makes it
harder for an attacker to generate thousands of identities in
the DHT. Significant computational resources are needed to
generate many identities. Also, many identities do only allow
to manipulate campaigns in small boundaries. It cannot be
avoided that a campaign takes place. A spammer may have
a botnet at hand that offers many computational resources.
However, using a botnet to manipulate the proposed anti-spam
solution also includes costs. Hence, the goal of the proposed
anti-spam solution is still achieved.
Campaign Coordinators check on a regular basis if there are
messages in their inbox. Campaign Coordinators only answer
a given maximum of challenges to avoid Denial of Service
Attacks.
To generate a challenge for client B, a client A concatenates
its public key PKClientB with two random numbers rand1
and rand2. rand1 and rand2 are taken from the intervall
[0,max rand] where max rand is a parameter for configu-
ration of the time needed to solve the challenge. A hash value
h is calculated using the hash function hf():
h = hf(PKClientB ||rand1||rand2) (1)
The challenge for client B is to find out which value rand2
was used in the calculation of h. The challenge sent to client
B is rand1. PKClientA is known from the message as it
identifies a client and is needed to send a message to client A.
To solve the challenge, client B follows the following
procedure:
1) Initialize test with 0
2) Calculate h′ = hf(PKClientA||rand1||test)
3) If h′! = h increase test by 1 and go to step 2
4) test is the solution of the challenge.
The challenge includes the public key of client A to avoid
that an attacker forwards received challenges to a legitimate
client that solves the challenge and sends it to the attacker that
sends the response back to the client. This man-in-the-middle
attack is prevented by the inclusion of the senders public key
in the challenge.
The trust values from the local trust database of the
Campaign Coordinator can be used to decide if a Cam-
paign Coordinator participates in a campaign or not. The
Campaign Coordinator only participates if the sum of all
trust values of the comrades of this campaign is higher
than minaccummulatedtrust. minaccummulatedtrust is a
configuration parameter of the campaign manager. To allow
for a quick start, minaccummulatedtrust starts at a low level
and is increased with each successful campaign.
VI. PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION
The Campaign Coordination described in Section IV is
agnostic to the underlaying peer-to-peer network. For the im-
plementation on Windows 7 the Campaign Coordinator relies
on Overlay Weaver [10], however changing the DHT only
requires minimal changes. Target Evaluator, Campaign Coor-
dinator, and Opt-Out Module are implemented as a program
running in the system tray. This program communicates with
the Spam Classifier implemented as Addon for the Thunderbird
mail client. The Spam Classifier is a simple button for the user
to identify spam in this prototype implementation. A more
advanced Spam Classifier will be part of further work. The
separation of the Spam Classifier from the other components
of the anti-spam solution allows an easy adaption of the
implementation for different email clients as only the Spam
Classifier must be adapted to different mail clients.
VII. DISCUSSION OF ATTACKS
This chapter evaluates the outcome of attacks on the
Campaign Coordinator.
One possible attack is a Man-in-the-Middle Attack on
the trust establishment. An adversary can forward challenges
received by clients to built trust to other clients to solve it for
them. However, this attack is not possible because the public
key of the sender of a challenge is included in the challenge
itself.
Another class of attacks are Denial of Service Attacks.
An adversary can generate many challenges for one client.
If this client wants to establish trust, it will solve all the
challenges, doing many computations. This attack is not suc-
cessful because clients only solve challenges sent by clients
that participate in one of their campaigns and the number of
challenges to solve is limited.
In a Time Portal Attack an adversary tries to move a
campaign in the very distant future such that the attack never
takes place. To do so, the adversary injects a campaign for a
URL into the Campaign Table that has a start date and time that
lies years in the future. Clients joining this campaign will never
send opt-out requests. In a Separation Attack an adversary tries
to reduce the number of comrades for a URL. This is done by
repeatedly injecting campaigns for the URL with a very early
start date and time. In this case, campaigns do not have the
chance to get many comrades, hence, the Opt-Out Modules
may decide not to send opt-out requests because the number
of comrades is not high enough. Both the Time Portal Attack
and the Separation Attack are avoided by the way a Campaign
Coordinator checks suitable start dates and times. The attacks
are further mitigated by the possibility to participate in more
than one campaign.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The anti-spam approach presented in this paper increases
the costs of websites advertised by spam and decreases
their revenue, hence, making advertising by unsolicited email
unattractive. Contrary to existing solutions, a decentralized
approach using a DHT has been chosen to avoid attacks. The
anti-spam approach offers protection against attacks like Man-
in-the-Middle Attacks, Denial of Service Attacks, Time Portal
Attacks as well as Separation Attacks. An implementation of
the anti-spam solution for the Thunderbird mail client exists.
Future work will target on the Opt-Out Module and the Target
Evaluator.
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